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Business Failures and the Small-Business Man
By Robert B. Hawthorn
If one were to ask one of his small-business acquaintances his 
opinion concerning the future of his business, he would probably 
say that the day had passed when a man with a small amount of 
capital could go into business and succeed or that the competition 
of the chain stores and the large independents is making it almost 
impossible for the small, local storekeeper to stay in business.
The reason for his believing this is more psychological than 
factual, for there appears to be little evidence to support either of 
these conclusions. Of course, if he accepts without further 
thought or analysis some of the failure statistics of one of the 
larger credit agencies, there might be some reason for believing 
that the small business is sinking into oblivion. It will be helpful 
to review and briefly analyse these statistics before coming to any 
conclusion.
The Bradstreet Company, which in 1933 merged with its rival, 
R. G. Dun & Co., reported in its 1932 yearbook that of some 
31,700 concerns which failed in the United States and Canada in 
1932, more than 28,000 or 89.3%, had not more than $20,000 of 
capital. Bradstreet further reported that in the decade from 1923 
to 1932 the failures numbered some 217,300, and that the failures 
for 1932 were over four times those of 1919 (the year in which the 
smallest number was recorded since 1880).
On the face of such revelations, it might appear that Mr. Small- 
Business Man knew what he was talking about. But if he con­
siders that the actual number of new businesses exceeded the 
failures during the same period by 48,000, this large number of 
failures should not arouse undue pessimism. The same may be 
said for the fact that the failures for 1932 were more than four 
times greater than those of 1919. It must be remembered that in 
1919 nearly all of us shared in the prosperity following the world 
war, which left nearly all of Europe prostrate and largely de­
pendent upon our unlimited and unimpaired resources. Nor 
should we lose sight of the fact that 1919, the year in which it may 
be said nobody complained about bad business, has been used as a 
kind of yardstick by both large and small in measuring the amount 
of business which they think should gravitate to them, forgetting 
90
Business Failures and the Small-Business Man
that then the main problem was getting merchandise to sell, not, 
as now, one of finding someone to buy it.
Probably the best indication that the small-business man is in 
error in believing that he is headed for the rocks is a comparison of 
the percentage of failures among small businesses for 1932 with the 
percentages for 1930 and 1931. This is the acid test. Those fail­
ing whose capital was $20,000 or less, it was noted, were 89 out of 
every 100. Does this not compare favorably with 95 for 1931 and 
96 for 1930? Does this not indicate that there was a decline of 
some 7% in the proportionate number of small-business failures 
from 1930 to 1932 and a proportionate increase in the large? 
Does this not indicate that the small business is decidedly holding 
its own?
The average small business man looks into the future with fore­
boding. Rarely does he consider what he hears and reads in the 
light of its real economic meaning. When his business is bad he 
usually blames others who, in most cases, have had little or noth­
ing to do with it. He never stops to consider that his trouble 
might be himself—his own shortcomings. While nearly every 
small-business man and every street-corner economist has a dif­
ferent view regarding the depression, its cause and its ultimate 
effect upon society, they all agree that the “chains ” and the larger 
independents are primarily responsible for the predicament of the 
small merchant. In fact, so much of this sort of thing has been 
said that many have given up and are now only waiting for their 
creditors to come along and close them up.
There has been a great deal of talk to the effect that one can not 
operate a business without capital—and by this is meant more 
capital than the average small business employs. Not only have 
the small merchants themselves advanced this argument, but 
it has been encouraged by large credit agencies and the Main- 
street commentators, whose opinions out of half-knowledge have 
had much to do with moulding the minds of the small, local store­
keepers.
It is manifestly true that there have been more failures among 
small businesses than there should have been; but to say that lack 
of capital has been the principal cause is, I think, to place too 
much emphasis on only one of the possible causes of failure.
But what, it may be asked, are the real underlying causes of the 
many failures? The question is indeed difficult to answer; it can 
hardly be answered to the satisfaction of all of us. Bradstreet, 
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for one, for a number of years attempted to classify them, but 
there was left much room for controversy. Bradstreet stated 
that lack of capital is unequivocally the predominant cause.
The following is a list of the causes of failure for 1932, and the 
relative percentage of each to the total, as taken from Bradstreet’s 
Business Year Review, issue January 28, 1933:
Incompetence.......................................................................... 13.6%
Inexperience............................................................................... 3.0
Lack of capital...................................................................... 30.2
Unwise credits............................................................................ 1.0





Total culpable internal cause......................................... 1.1
Competition............................................................................ 1.1
Unfavorable circumstances.................................................... 49.0
Failure of others..................................................................... 1.0
Total external cause....................................................... 51.1
100.0%
Of the personal or “internal” causes, according to this sum­
mary, lack of capital has led the field, with incompetence and 
inexperience. Taken together, a fairly close second. Inasmuch 
as there is little to distinguish them, the two have been combined 
here in order to eliminate the possibility of confusion. Obviously, 
if a man is inexperienced, he is also incompetent—at least he is 
incompetent until he acquires experience. A man may be a good 
carpenter, for example, and yet prove himself wholly inefficient 
if called upon to manage the affairs of a large lumber mill or furni­
ture factory. As I see it, almost all of Bradstreet’s internal causes, 
both culpable and inculpable, are closely related.
Many small-business men are, no doubt, doomed to failure from 
the start, simply because they have not the remotest idea of the 
capital that is necessary or what knowledge they should possess to 
insure the success of their undertaking. Failure in such cases 
might be attributed, not only to lack of capital, but to several other 
things as well.
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The following episode will illustrate the folly of attempting to 
attribute to some one cause each of the thousands of business 
failures:
Some few years ago I knew a man, a salesman for one of the 
fairly large instalment houses, who became dissatisfied with his 
position and resigned. He felt confident that he could succeed 
with a store of his own. With the little money he had saved up 
and with what else he was able to borrow from his credulous rela­
tives, he started out, endeavoring to compete with his former em­
ployer. His whole capital outlay did not exceed $8,000 or $9,000. 
To complete the story, he bought at the outset some $15,000 of 
merchandise, $10,000 of which was on credit, rented a large store, 
and spent nearly the entire balance of his money, about $3,000, on 
fixtures, before selling a dollar’s worth of merchandise. He set 
out to do the volume of business his former employer had done— 
and did do it. The sheriff closed up the business eighteen months 
afterward.
I should like to know how Bradstreet classified my friend, 
whether his failure was charged to lack of capital or to inexperience 
—or to what. My guess is that all the causes under the first 
caption and perhaps one or two under the second or third were 
responsible. If, however, I were forced to decide definitely, my 
conclusion, like Bradstreet’s, would be purely a guess, notwith­
standing that I know intimately the man and his methods of do­
ing business. Had this man had more capital he might have 
eventually succeeded; he might have been able to overcome his 
costly errors of judgment and have made a success. On the other 
hand, he probably would have failed anyway. Incompetence 
and inexperience as a rule go hand in hand with lack of capital. If 
a man ventures into business without sufficient capital, there is 
usually some other weakness more serious and deep-rooted.
Capital deficiency sometimes has its virtues as well as its vices. 
Someone once asked one of our so-called captains of industry 
what was the cause of his success. His reply was: "Lack of 
capital.” Personally, I am inclined to believe that, if the facts 
were known, lack of capital, without incompetence or inexperience 
projecting themselves into the picture, would be found actually 
responsible for far less than 30% of the total failures.
The importance of lack of capital as a cause of failure has been 
much discounted in an investigation of 512 failures in 1930 in 
New Jersey, made by the department of commerce in collabora­
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tion with the institute of human relations of the law school of 
Yale. Their report has this to say:
In tabulations of the causes of business failure, one frequently 
finds “lack of capital” near the top of the list. This is easily 
understood. In viewing the failed concern, with its huge debts 
and small assets, both debtors and creditors have a tendency in­
correctly to attribute the failure to lack of capital. They look 
back over the months preceding failure, when the debtor had dif­
ficulty in raising money to meet his obligations, and the matter 
seemed obvious; he failed because he lacked capital.
Lack of capital was not an important cause of failure in the 
cases studied. In most of these cases where failure was attributed 
to lack of capital, something else was the cause. These individ­
uals had control over all the capital they could efficiently ad­
minister; in fact, in a few instances, the figures seemed to indicate 
that too much capital, rather than too little, contributed to the 
downfall. The owners of the businesses had received generous 
extensions of credit, the proceeds of which had been used up 
gradually through lack of proper management. They then 
lacked capital, it is true, but this condition was a result of failure, 
rather than a cause of it. Undoubtedly at times competent busi­
ness men launch themselves on enterprises with possibilities for 
success, and are forced into failure because, for some reason or 
other, they are unable to secure credit to carry on the business; 
but these cases are rare and were inconspicuous in the New Jersey 
study. . . .
Unwise credit, it therefore would appear, has had little to do 
with the many failures. It has been responsible for only one 
per cent. of the total. Here there seems to be a conflict of causes. 
Undoubtedly, many failures attributed to laxity in granting credit 
have been classified under lack of capital, incompetence or in­
experience. The fact that these are general causes, any one of 
which might embrace unwise credit, leads me to believe that 
Bradstreet might have classified some of our victims of “unwise 
credit” as “incompetents.” That he was incompetent might 
easily be said about a person who had not recognized the im­
portance of collecting his accounts. It is hard to perceive how a 
person can fail because of his laxity in extending credit without his 
being either incompetent or inexperienced. It is much like a 
doctor’s saying that the death of one of his patients was due to 
some infectious disease, while that of another, who suffered alike, 
was due to his heart’s ceasing to function. Since it is nothing 
more than a “hangover” from injudicious selling, unwise credit 
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most certainly is a form of either incompetence or inexperience or 
both.
In nearly all the failed concerns with which I have come in 
contact during the past twelve years, credit losses have been 
heavy. Particularly is this true in the case of small businesses. 
The New Jersey study revealed that bad-debt losses in some in­
stances were as high as 40% of open credit sales. Concerning 
credit and credit losses, the investigators’ report reads thus:
The poor credit methods of the businesses which failed are 
evidenced by the large losses on bad debts. . . . For the year 
preceding failure the average bad debt loss on open credit . . . 
was 7.2% [of credit sales]. The average loss on instalment credit 
was 17.1%. . . . According to the reports of the national retail 
credit survey conducted by the department of commerce, the 
average open-credit loss for all types of retailers was 0.6%.
The difference, then, between the average percentages of credit 
losses of the successful and the unsuccessful would indicate that 
unwise credit has had a great deal to do with the many failures. 
Regardless of how efficiently it is run otherwise, no retail business 
can survive when it loses continually in worthless accounts 17%— 
or even 7%—of its sales. The foregoing percentages are, I think, 
representative of the whole country. Certainly New Jersey does 
not differ from other states in this matter.
To account for such a large percentage of credit losses is not 
difficult. To begin with, the average small merchant often sells 
his goods to persons who he knows are “deadbeats,” thinking that 
they will pay him when they do not pay others. In other words, 
he is momentarily more interested in making the sale than in 
whether or not he will eventually collect for it.
As a matter of fact, very few small-business men avail them­
selves of the services of their local credit exchange or association, 
whose files contain the credit history of almost every local buyer. 
In order to save the cost of membership, which is often nominal, 
many small merchants extend credit without inquiring into the 
credit standing of their customers. As a result, these small 
merchants often lose in bad accounts in the course of a year much 
more than would be their cost of membership.
The credit exchange, needless to say, is a necessary adjunct to 
modern business. These exchanges, located in nearly every city 
or town of any consequence, have had more than anything else 
to do with stabilizing and strengthening credit all over the 
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country. Many persons who otherwise would not pay their bills, 
knowing that their local credit association keeps a record of how 
they meet their obligations, now pay.
Recently I asked a credit exchange manager how many small, 
local merchants were members of his association. “Not over 
25%,” he answered. Of the New Jersey failures, whose credit 
losses and credit methods were studied, the percentage was much 
smaller than that. “Of the 238 businesses reporting on the sub­
ject, 32, or 13.4%, used credit bureaus, and 206, or 86.6%, did 
not. ...”
It is generally conceded that poor management is the parent 
cause of business failure. Particularly is this true in the case of 
small businesses.
Now why should there be so few good managers among small­
business men? Not long ago I asked one of my clients, a success­
ful small merchant, his views on the question. “They are,” he 
said, “unable to manage themselves. And those who do pretend 
to mind their affairs,” he added, “never accomplish anything, for 
the simple reason that they persist in sticking to methods which 
are as out of date as hoopskirts.”
Here is sounded, probably, the keynote to the whole score. 
Very often—too often, no doubt—business men, both large and 
small, become engrossed in matters foreign to their own businesses. 
Golf, which is now indulged in by the proletariat as well as those 
higher up the business ladder, has perhaps drawn the minds of 
many away from their businesses. The increase in the number of 
golf courses and in the manufacture of golf paraphernalia since the 
war tends to show the plausibility of this conjecture. This brings 
to mind another example not dissimilar, and that is the large 
number of men who, before the market crash in 1929, dissipated 
much of their time watching the blackboards in the offices of their 
brokers. I know of several who invested in stocks at inflated 
prices (on margin) more than they had in their own businesses.
Good merchandising is probably the most vital factor in the 
success of a business enterprise. Yet nearly all that a vast num­
ber of small business executives know about it is buying something 
for one price and selling it for another. Such problems as over­
stocks, overhead—that is, keeping the expense under the margin 
of gross profit—little concern them.
Like the extension of credit, the importance of bookkeeping is 
often underestimated. More often the rule than the exception, 
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the small-business man seems to believe that bookkeeping is a use­
less adornment, one which only adds to his overhead—something 
which only his larger competitor can afford. He never stops to 
consider that comprehensible records can be made to “pay for 
their keep” in information which can be used in the constructive 
management of affairs.
The New Jersey investigators found that over 50% of those 
whose bookkeeping methods were studied kept inadequate 
records. “Of 408 businesses for which information was secured 
on this point 96 (25.5%) kept no books at all, 120 (29.4%) kept 
books which were inadequate for the purpose of showing the condi­
tion of the business, and 192 (47.1%) kept books which might 
be described as adequate. . . .”
It may be said, then, in all propriety, that the lack of proper 
records or of any at all has contributed largely to many failures. 
It can hardly have been a coincidence that most of the concerns 
whose failures were studied kept books which were said to be 
inadequate.
“But this is the age of the specialist.” How often have we 
heard these or similar words. While specialized knowledge may 
be an essential of the mental equipment of a large-business execu­
tive, it sometimes proves to be an impediment to his small-busi­
ness contemporary. For instance, a man with years of experi­
ence in the purchasing department of a large corporation might 
venture into the field of small business and fail. Such a man 
might place undue emphasis upon the buying function to the 
neglect of others and buy himself into bankruptcy. In fact, a 
specialist in a small business is wholly out of place. I know of 
three recent failures which were largely due to the fact that the 
men in charge put too much stress upon one phase of management 
—selling. They paid little or no attention to the others, which 
they thought of little consequence. These men were good sales­
men and nothing else. It never occurred to them that their grab­
bag buying and their trial-and-error methods of administration 
would overshadow their ability to sell. I here mention overselling 
and overbuying, not because they are necessarily the most serious 
breaches of good management, but mainly because they are 
believed to be the two most common causes of failure. “Over” 
anything else, of course, can be equally hazardous.
Even if I were capable of discussing the many phases of manage­
ment, I could hardly do so here for lack of space. Besides, this 
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article is intended to be one of diagnosis rather than prescription. 
Moreover, anything that might be said would be perhaps only a 
repetition of the platitudes with which the most of us are already 
familiar. The whole field of management, as I see it, so far as it 
concerns the small-business man, can be summarized in a very few 
words: He must know something about almost everything related 
to his business, since it is not large enough to warrant his employ­
ing others experienced in the several branches—buying, selling, 
credits and collections, accounting, personnel, etc.—to assist him. 
In short, he must make himself an all-around executive, one who 
can wrestle with and solve the many problems of present-day 
management.
One of the most familiar cries of the small-business man these 
days is “competition.” He considers it probably the most 
dangerous of his common enemies. Competition is, in most 
cases, however, an excuse for failure, rather than a cause of it. 
Conversely, competition sometimes has a good effect; it tends to 
lessen the number of failures by forcing the less progressive to put 
into practice in their own businesses some of the efficiency 
responsible for the success of their competitors. A further indica­
tion of the stimulating effect of competition, in some cases, is the 
fact that many businesses thrive in groups.
Proving that there is still virtue in the old adage, “In union 
there is strength,” many kinds of businesses have found it 
profitable to band together for research in their respective fields. 
Cost, expense and earning figures are exchanged by the members 
of the various groups. Nearly all the large department stores— 
and many of the smaller ones also—are affiliated with the National 
Retail Dry Goods Association and the bureau of business research 
of Harvard for the mutual exchange of information beneficial to 
the trade as a whole. If small-business men were to organize 
themselves in a similar way, study the methods of their successful 
colleagues and make a serious attempt to analyze and to eliminate 
their own individual deficiencies, they would have little to fear 
from their imaginary enemies, the “chains” and the large 
independents.
It is conceded that the national recovery act has been rather 
disappointing to the “new dealers” generally in its failure to 
bring about a large measure of recovery. The inequities of the 
N.R.A., so far as they concern the small-business man, have been 
brought to our attention many times during the past year and 
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need no repetition here. Regardless of what we may say about it, 
it has at least stimulated the tendency of business generally to or­
ganize. Independent wholesalers and retailers are forming buy­
ing pools, which are nothing more than unions. The National 
Retailers Council is calling to arms retailers in all lines for the 
purpose of organizing to promote cooperative buying. As this 
movement gains momentum, the large national “chains” will 
have a powerful foe with which to reckon.
As I see it, all retailers—and this includes the “chains” as well 
—have most to fear the present tendency of consumers themselves 
to organize—to band together and deal direct with manufacturers 
and producers. This movement, in fact, is spreading rapidly.
But what, it might be asked, of the public’s attitude toward the 
small-business man? Has it undergone any material change dur­
ing this era of “scientific” management? As a lay observer, I 
would say that it has not; on the contrary, the public still has a 
deep affection for him, although he does not always believe it. 
The average consumer will continue to patronize him, provided he 
will put forth some effort to keep pace with the times.
About all that the “chains ” and the large independents offer the 
public in competition with the small-business man are prices 
somewhat lower than his. Even this is a moot question, if we 
stop to place a value upon the service which the independent 
merchant often renders. Many housewives never seem to con­
sider it. Let us assume that the “chains” do undersell him. 
Even so, the price differential is often negligible. In fact, the 
“chains’” low prices are in many instances a myth. When the 
difference is small, as is the case generally, it seldom offsets the 
personal appeal, that of the friend and neighbor. Everything 
else being nearly equal, the average buyer likes to transact busi­
ness with someone whom he knows intimately, someone who mani­
fests a genuine interest in his welfare and in that of his family.
Since the war many of the larger concerns have attempted to 
invoke the social aspect as a kind of antidote to competition. 
They have sought to employ clerks with a wide acquaintance in 
the city or town, chosen not for their business acumen or their 
knowledge of what their employer has to sell, but for their ability 
to “break down the customer’s sales resistance.” But somehow 
these concerns have not been quite able to imitate this air of 
friendliness, which is, and always has been, one of the small­
business man’s chief assets. The small-business man, it seems, 
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has a monopoly in the art of injecting a spirit of altruism 
into his dealings with those who patronize him. He does not 
always know, however, when it reaches a point of diminishing 
returns.
One never hears a discussion about competition nowadays 
without something said about the chain-store “menace.” Many 
believe that the “chains” are threatening to make threadbare our 
whole economic fabric. This may be so; but I, for one, am not 
yet convinced of it. Although the chain-store scheme is nearly a 
hundred years old, it appears to be still more or less an experi­
ment, in view of the number of changes in the methods of mer­
chandising which may have been effected in the past decade and 
the number of stores which have come and gone in our cities and 
towns. Nor do the compilations of the bureau of the census, 
whose figures are probably the most trustworthy that we have, 
indicate that the business of the chains has reached the gargan­
tuan size that many would have us believe. The census reported 
that in 1930 only 10% of the retail stores were chains and that 
they made 21% of the total retail sales. It reports also that their 
main activity has been confined to four or five retail businesses, 
principally groceries, clothing and shoes. The ill effects of chain 
competition, then, would appear to be more imaginary than 
real. At least, these figures should relieve the minds of those 
who have felt that the “chains” are gobbling up most of the 
retail business!
I do not mean to imply that the small, local merchants have not 
suffered from chain competition, for they have. There is 
scarcely a village or hamlet that does not have its “ Dizzy- 
Lizzy” specialty store or its “Willy-Nilly” grocery, competing 
for a share of the meager trade. It is also true that the “chains,” 
through their large purchasing power, their ability to employ 
competent people in all departments, and their careful control 
over stock and capital turnovers, have reduced to no little degree 
the sales and profits of the small storekeepers.
Whether the “chains” will continue to thrive remains to be 
seen. As Stuart Chase has said: “The ‘chains’ are locked in 
sanguinary struggles among themselves—there are just so many 
prize locations on main street.” In his book Prosperity: Fact or 
Myth, written in 1929 and published in July, 1930, he tells us that 
in a survey of 500 independent grocery store failures, it was found 
that 65% were due to inexperience; 17% to fires, floods, robbery
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and sickness; 17% to character breakdown; and that only 1.4% 
were due to competition. One’s behavior, then, would seem to 
have something to do with one’s success in business!
Today many problems confront the “chains.” The most im­
portant perhaps is high rent. Many chain-store operators now 
have a veritable millstone around their necks in the form of leases 
at high rentals which were made when it looked is if the bubble 
of prosperity, radiating every color of the spectrum, would remain 
afloat indefinitely. The second in importance, probably, is that, 
in recent years, much propaganda has been spread depicting the 
chains’ damaging effects to our community life and standards of 
living. To combat the enemy, independent merchants have en­
listed their city, town and even their state officers and many 
consumers into a vast army, one ready to defend the home mer­
chants against the “invasion.” The state in which I live (Louisi­
ana) has been recently added to the list of those that have enacted 
legislation aimed at the large national chains. The tax bill 
passed by the last regular session of the legislature levies a tax 
ranging from $10 to $550 upon each individual store in the state, 
depending upon the number of stores each owner operates all over 
the United States. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Com­
pany, which operates about one hundred stores in Louisiana, will 
thus pay a tax of some $50,000 a year.
The local merchant’s grievance against the chains is familiar to 
us all. For that reason I hesitate to repeat it. But since it is 
necessary in order to show the fallacy of it, I shall do so anyway. 
It is argued that the chains send away from the community all, or 
nearly all, the money they take in and that very little ever gets 
back to the local people by way of local expenditures. Even upon 
cursory analysis there seems to be little to support such an argu­
ment. The chains, like the home merchants, are dependent upon 
the communities in which they operate. If the community is not 
prosperous, certainly they can not prosper. The chains, more­
over, can not monopolize the business unless they can greatly 
undersell their local competitors—which some of us believe they 
can not do.
The chains, as I view it, are presently caught in a vise—high 
rent on the one side and a steadily rising tide of prejudice against 
them on the other. And the grip on the tightening screw is held 
by none other than two of the home folk, the local real-estate 
owner and the local merchant. The former has behind him his 
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monthly maturing rent notes, and the latter his organized force of 
propagandists—his friends, neighbors and sympathizers.
It has not been my desire, as I have tried to make clear, to air 
the deficiencies of the small-business man. In this discussion of 
the causes of failure, I have attempted merely to show that most 
of the failures have been due, not to the small businesses having 
become antiquated, but largely to the small-business men them­
selves, who have been reluctant to follow a formula which might 
insure success.
The average small-business man has been slow to seek out the 
real cause of his adversity. In centering on what he believes it to 
be, he has accused, as I stated at the beginning, those who have 
little to do with it. Chains and independents larger than he have 
sprung up around him and from outward appearances have 
prospered, while he has failed to prosper; hence his confirmed be­
lief that the competition they have given him has been wholly 
responsible for his inability to succeed.
Perhaps he ought not to be censured for believing this, since to 
blame others for that for which we ourselves are to blame is a most 
common trait of human nature. Rarely does one attempt a 
critical analysis of one’s self and of one’s own shortcomings. The 
real reason, I think, that the small-business man's perspective is 
somewhat distorted is that the transition of modern business has 
been gradual—too gradual for him to see the changes which have 
taken place around him and to recognize their significance.
In the past decade, business has undergone a complete trans­
formation. The transformation has been for a makeshift tool to 
an intricate machine, a machine whose wheels have to be lubri­
cated if it is to function properly. Guesswork, to put it plainly, 
has been supplanted by sound business methods.
The present economic dilemma has brought about many 
reversals of the old order. For one thing, control of many of the 
large concerns has passed into the hands of the bankers, whose 
ability to run them appears indeed questionable, if we stop to 
consider the wholesale bank failures during the three years preced­
ing the bank “holiday.” The utter collapse of the whole banking 
structure on the day the “new deal” took office should convince 
the most credulous that the bankers have their hands full getting 
their own house in order. Moreover, a great many of us are not so 
sure that the bankers are capable of managing alien businesses. 
While corporate stockholders may not be asking pertinent ques­
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tions about dividends, they are still wondering why there have 
been such large shrinkages in the value of their holdings. This 
alone is causing both the bankers and the corporate managers 
deep concern, especially those of the former who sold or unwit­
tingly recommended securities to their customers.
As for the chains, the depression has made it difficult for many 
of them to keep up the pace at which they traveled a few years 
ago. One of the largest, a drug chain, two or three years ago 
went so far as to champion a bill in the national congress to 
prohibit price-cutting, not only in its own field, but in every other. 
Thus we see, strange as it may seem, a nauseous prescription 
forced upon the one concocting it. Thus we see that price-cutting 
has reacted forcefully, if not forcibly, against one of those initiat­
ing the practice.
Obviously, in times like these it becomes necessary for execu­
tives, both large and small, to pursue a policy of retrenchment. 
And it is here that the small business has a decided advantage. 
It is more flexible; it can effect economies much quicker than the 
average big business and thus enhance its chances of survival. 
Many have done this. "Hard times,” as Charles G. Ross said, 
in an article some time ago in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “have 
produced hard thinking.” The small-business man who has thus 
far escaped the clutches of the sheriff and has managed to hold on 
to enough of his capital to enable him to carry on is in a strategic 
position, a far better position than some of his larger competitors.
Contrary to the belief of many, I see little evidence to support 
the theory that the small business will eventually be obliterated. 
Those who believe that the small business is going the way of some 
of our other traditions have not, I think, sought out the real cause 
of the many failures.
While the number of small businesses—or the number of larger 
ones, for that matter—may not materially increase until we can 
find some cure for our economic ills, everything points to a stur­
dier, sounder small business in the future. Many of the formerly 
successful larger businesses are now small businesses, and the 
depleted ranks of the small-business men are being rapidly filled 
in with recruits. These recruits, fall, roughly, into two groups:
First, we have the thousands of graduates of the schools of 
commerce of our universities who, upon entering college a few 
years ago, envisioned mahogany desks and fat salaries, which 
usually go with executive positions in the big corporations.
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These would-be Rockefellers and Carnegies have had to go back 
home, whether they wanted to or not. In brief, General Motors’ 
“loss” has been the general store’s gain.
Secondly, we have those whom we looked upon some few years 
ago as “big-business” men, by virtue of their employment with 
the large corporations, who have since joined the ranks of the un­
employed. These men, having been cast adrift by concerns 
whose executives thought it necessary to reduce their personnel 
to keep from failing or had uppermost in their minds the protec­
tion of that all-important personage, the stockholder, are opening 
up small businesses themselves. And—most encouraging thing 
of all—they are bringing their efficiency with them.
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